Apollonian and Dionysian Metascience

Quick reflections on the two different cultures driving metascience research

TL;DR: When we talk about metascience, we are to some extent talking about two complementary movements, with important differences in style and spirit. There is a place for both these movements, and the creative tension between them is valuable and generative. At the same time, I think that distinguishing between the two groups is conceptually useful.

With apologies to Nietzsche, Albert Szent-Györgi, and everyone else who has deployed this venerable metaphor in other contexts, I call the two camps the Apollonians and the Dionysians.

In Greek mythology, Apollo was wise, logical and reasonable, the god of archery and useful arts like medicine; Dionysius was the wild man, the patron of wine, riot and ecstasy. Likewise, the Apollonians and the Dionysians bring different approaches and motivations to the endeavour of metascience.

The Apollonians bring the rigour of careful study from a range of fields, including the social sciences but also history, information studies and computer sciences (the Research on Research Institute have a fascinating mapping of the variety of disciplines publishing on metascience topics). The Apollonian vision of metascience is that the tools of research can help us improve research itself.

And as many people have noted, it draws on several traditions that long predate the recent enthusiasm for the term metascience, in particular the field of innovation studies. Many work in academia and aspire to academic standards of rigour and publishing incentives, but not all (the Innovation and Growth Lab, incubating in Nesta; Open Philanthropy and the Institute for Progress are all to some extent participants in the Apollonian tendency).

The Dionysians, on the other hand, embody a visceral feeling that science could be done better. They include a fair share of scientists dissatisfied with existing funding systems or research incentives. It also draws heavily on Silicon Valley and Rationalist ideas, not least the enthusiasm for disruption, and the idea that systems can get stuck in what Eliezer Yudkowsky called inadequate equilibria.

This aspect of the metascience movement is closely linked to the establishment of Focused Research Organisations (like ARIA in the UK or the Arc Institute in the US) and other new ways of funding or managing research, which are generally more informed by the ‘craft knowledge’ of researchers than by academic analysis.

Of course, it wouldn’t do to overegg the dichotomy here. Many Apollonians take an intense interest in designing new and better institutions, and are driven by a dissatisfaction with the existing system, while many Dionysians are keen consumers of studies on what works in science funding and care a lot about evidence. One might even suggest that the two groups have an improving effect on one another. The Dionysians supply practical knowledge and prevent Apollonian metascience becoming an overly conceptual exercise; the Apollonians anchor the Dionysians to empirical reality, reducing the power of unfounded assertions from charismatic advocates or rich donors.

It seems to me that the two tendencies combine to make metascience a more powerful movement: truth-seeking and reform can, after all, be powerful complementary motivations. Nevertheless, I think the distinction between the Dionysians and the Apollonians describes a real difference in approaches metascience, and one that is useful for anyone who cares about the future of the field.

(This post is based on remarks I made at the Research on Research Institute’s board meeting in Oslo in October 2024 - thanks to RoRI’s director, James Wilsdon, for spurring me to write this up.)